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Abstract
In the UK both the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority have 
recently carried out experiments using new digital technology for regulatory pur-
poses. The idea is to replace rules written in natural legal language with computer 
code and to use artificial intelligence for regulatory purposes. This new way of 
designing regulatory rules is in line with the UK government’s vision for the coun-
try to become a global leader in digital technology. It is also reflected in the FCA’s 
business plan. The article reviews the technology and the advantages and disadvan-
tages of combining the technology with regulatory law. It then informs the discus-
sion from a broader perspective. It analyses regulatory technology through crite-
ria developed in the mainstream regulatory debate. It contributes to that debate by 
anticipating problems that will arise as the technology evolves. In addition, the hope 
is to assist the government in avoiding mistakes that have occurred in the past and 
creating a better system from the start.
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1 Introduction
Technology changes society. Distributed ledger technology (hereinafter also referred 
to as ‘DLT’) has been described as having the potential to disrupt how and by whom 
financial and other services are delivered and regulated.1 Artificial intelligence 
already does and will increasingly shape our society in the future.2 The law needs to 
adapt to this change and can benefit from it.
This is at present particularly true for financial regulation. Recent advances in 
computer science could produce technological solutions that facilitate financial reg-
ulation.3 Such solutions have been referred to as ‘regulatory technology’. Regula-
tory technology has been described as a game changer.4 It is said to have the poten-
tial to streamline compliance and increase efficiency for both the regulator and the 
regulated entities in financial markets.5 It could enable the regulator to supervise 
the entire population of regulated entities relying on deep evidence delivered in real 
time. It could free up regulatory capital or remove the need for it altogether. Brexit 
gives the UK greater freedom to develop a framework of its own. The government is 
keen for the UK to become a global leader in digital technology.6 Now seems like a 
good time to incorporate new digital technology into regulation.
A significant amount of academic work has been done on FinTech, the com-
bination of digital technology with the delivery of financial services.7 The use of 
technology for the purpose of financial regulation has not yet received a substantial 
amount of attention.8 This is not surprising as the process of integrating digital tech-
nology into regulation is still in flux. Recent developments, however, indicate that 
regulatory technology has reached a stage in its development where it benefits from 
broader analytical scrutiny.
An increasing number of technology focused start-ups are attempting to develop 
regulatory technology.9 Regulated entities are interested because the increase in 
regulatory requirements following the financial crisis has made compliance costly.10 
2 Two recent covers of The Economist focus on artificial intelligence: ‘The Next Frontier—When 
Thoughts Control Machines’, 4 January 2018 and ‘Doctor You—A Revolution in Health Care is Com-
ing’, 3 February 2018. The issue of 14 February 2018 contains seven articles that use the term ‘artificial 
intelligence’: pp 12, 30, 60, 68, 69, 78 and 79.
3 Financial Conduct Authority (2015).
4 Arner et al. (2017), p 371; Enriques (2017), p 53.
5 Colaert (2015); Packin (2018), pp 206–207; Arner et  al. (2017), pp 374–375 and 388–389; see also 
Arner et al. (2016), p 79; Institute of International Finance (2016).
6 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, BEIS Digital, Data and Technology (2017).
7 See for example most recently, Chiu (2017), p 743; for a general analysis of financial innovation from a 
regulatory perspective see Evgoulas (2015), p 660.
8 There is an emerging literature on legal technology assisting or replacing lawyers and other legal deci-
sion makers. See, for example, Pasquale (2019).
9 Colaert (2015), para. 45; Arner et al. (2017), p 381.
10 Colaert (2015), para. 8; Arner et al. (2017), pp 374–375 and 388–389.
1 ‘Hype springs eternal; The blockchain in finance’, The Economist (London), 19 March 2016, p 73; see 
also Yeung (2019), p 207.
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Regulators are interested because they too want to save money.11 They also would 
like to promote growth and support innovation.12 In the UK both the Financial Con-
duct Authority (hereinafter also referred to as ‘FCA’) and the Bank of England have 
recently carried out experiments involving the use of new digital technologies.
The aim of this article is to examine the implications of using technology for reg-
ulatory purposes. The article also informs the discussion from a broader perspective. 
It brings the area under the scrutiny of the mainstream regulatory debate. It also 
contributes to that debate by anticipating the problems that will arise as the technol-
ogy evolves. In addition, the hope is to assist the regulator and regulated entities in 
avoiding mistakes that have occurred in the past and creating a better system right 
from the start.
In Sect. 2 the technology will be examined. After that two potential use cases for 
regulatory technology and their effect on the regulatory landscape will be discussed: 
digital reporting and artificial intelligence as a risk management tool. The process 
of reporting individual data points could be organised through distributed ledger 
technology and combined with artificial intelligence. In the future, artificial intel-
ligence could be incorporated into prudential regulation to monitor the records of a 
broader range of transactions or perhaps even the entire IT system of regulated enti-
ties (Sect. 3). Then criteria that have been developed to scrutinise regulatory quality 
will be mapped onto regulatory technology (Sect. 4). Section 5 will take the analysis 
to a more particular level by examining how the challenges posed by the integra-
tion of digital technology into regulation vary according to regulatory strategy. The 
paper will discuss command regulation, self-regulatory models and meta-regulation. 
It will also analyse an activity-based regulatory model. Section 6 will conclude and 
make recommendations.
The main conclusion of the article is that regulatory technology poses different 
challenges depending on the regulatory strategy adopted by the government. The 
technology itself, however, serves those who pay for its development. It does not 
deliver a silver bullet that will make it easier for regulated entities to align their busi-
ness interests with the public interest.
Another important point is that the role of technology providers will have to be 
kept under review. As regulatory technology is integrated into regulation the provid-
ers of technology become positioned as gatekeepers but do not necessarily have the 
right incentives to operate in the public interest. The problems that can emerge are 
exacerbated by the fact that there is a potential for the oligopolistic market that is 
currently dominating data analysis to move into the realm of regulation.
If the regulator integrates new digital technologies it will need to retain a substan-
tial amount of oversight over its design to be able to retain democratic legitimacy 
and accountability as well as operate on the basis of due process.
11 Financial Conduct Authority (2018a), p 27.
12 Zetzsche et al. (2017), p 34.
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2  The Technology
At present, neither the Financial Conduct Authority nor the Bank of England have 
adopted or endorsed any particular technological solution. They are, however, hold-
ing themselves ready and are proactively engaging with market participants.
In the UK the FCA launched its ‘Project Innovate’ in October 2014.13 The project 
includes regulatory technology.14 The Bank of England has created a Fintech Hub 
which incorporates the work that the Bank has carried out in relation to integrating 
new digital technologies into its own organisation.15
Because regulatory technology is in development it is worth considering more 
broadly what those creating such tools are using for inspiration. There are a number 
of new digital technologies which can support regulatory aims. These technologies 
and their components will be introduced in this section.
2.1  Distributed Ledger Technology
Distributed ledger technology was developed for Bitcoin which is a form of money 
that is not backed by the government of any state. It was designed as a peer-to-peer 
system that enabled individuals to transfer money without using banks. A record of 
which individual owns how much money is shared publicly between the participat-
ing individuals who each hold an identical copy of the entire record on their own 
home computer. This record is referred to as a distributed ledger. Participants are not 
identified by name but by a number which is referred to as ‘public key’. The ledger 
is updated by consensus of the participants. Each participant has a passcode referred 
to as ‘private key’ to access their own money.
Distributed ledger technology can be combined with what is referred to as a smart 
contract. This is a computer programme which runs on a distributed ledger and auto-
matically transfers money when certain pre-defined events occur. For example, it 
pays out a certain sum at regular intervals or when an index reaches a certain level.
Bitcoin started as a libertarian project but the technology also lends itself to non-
libertarian applications. The Bitcoin ledger itself has, since it first started, developed 
into an intermediated system where those participants who maintain the register are 
no longer individuals but have become similar to custodians.16
A distributed ledger could be used by banks or other financial services provid-
ers.17 The Bank of England has, for example, conducted tests to determine if the 
technology could be used for its inter-bank settlement system. It concluded that at 
16 Micheler and von der Heyde (2016), p 631.
17 Paech (2017), p 1073.
13 Financial Conduct Authority (2018e); see also Financial Conduct Authority (2016), pp 13–14.
14 Financial Conduct Authority (2018h).
15 Financial Conduct Authority (2018f).
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present the technology is not mature enough but is ensuring that its new RTGS sys-
tem will be compatible with the technology.18
The technology can also be used to record ownership of assets other than money.19 
The use of distributed ledger technology for assets is currently being explored by 
start-ups as well as incumbent market participants. The FCA have published a dis-
cussion paper in April 2017 and a feedback statement in December 2017.20 If mar-
ket participants develop a DLT system through which they hold and transfer finan-
cial assets, this could be connected with regulatory technology. The regulator could 
become a participant enabling it to monitor, supervise and audit trades including 
smart contracts.21
A distributed ledger can also be used to share information. This component of the 
technology could be of interest for regulatory purposes. We will see below that the 
FCA has conducted experiments to use the technology for regulatory reporting.
2.2  Artificial Intelligence
It is difficult to define ‘intelligence’ and there is no generally accepted definition of 
‘artificial intelligence’.22 Artificial intelligence includes software that is able to play 
games such as chess or go calculating its way through potential combinations of 
moves.23 It also includes software that perceives and reacts to the surrounding envi-
ronment enabling it to control cars autonomously.24 For the purposes of financial 
regulation two applications of artificial intelligence are of interest: machine learning 
and natural language processing.
2.2.1  Machine Learning
Financial regulation could benefit from software that reviews large amounts of data 
to identify patterns that may indicate unusual activity or previously unnoticed cor-
relations indicating that certain risks may have emerged.25 Such programmes are 
already used for fraud prevention purposes where they monitor credit and debit card 
transactions. They are sometimes referred to as machine learning.
Risk is also visible in communication patterns. In a recent study the authors have, 
for example, analysed emails sent by 144 senior Enron employees in the lead up to 
the company’s collapse. They found that in addition to certain terms that appear in 
18 For more information see https ://www.banko fengl and.co.uk/resea rch/finte ch/proof -of-conce pt 
(accessed 6 June 2019).
19 Micheler and von der Heyde (2016); The Australian Stock Exchange has announced that it will oper-
ate its clearing and settlement system using distributed ledger technology from 2020, see Eyers (2018); 
see also https ://www.asx.com.au/servi ces/chess -repla cemen t.htm.
20 Financial Conduct Authority (2018c); Financial Conduct Authority (2018d).
21 Hileman and Rauchs (2017), p 64; see also Yeung (2019), pp 220–224.
22 Scherer (2016), p 359; Firth-Butterfield et al. (2017), chapter 24.
23 Scherer (2016), pp 361 and 364.
24 Firth-Butterfield et al. (2017).
25 Yeung (2018).
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such emails and that indicate emerging problems, the length of emails and their fre-
quency are indicators of escalating problems.26 It would be possible to use this form 
of analysis for regulatory purposes.
2.2.2  Transforming Natural Language into Computer Language
Connected with machine learning is a technique in computer science where com-
puters process speech or written text created by human beings. A type of this form 
of technology is used by Google Translate and by digital assistants such as Alexa, 
Google or Siri. It is also used by businesses to operate telephone systems or cus-
tomer service centres.
For financial regulation, similar technology can be used to read rules and trans-
late their content into computer programmes which then process data. At present the 
software is not yet sufficiently advanced to adequately cope with the full spectrum 
of subtleties used in human language. For this reason, a double translation process 
is evolving. In a first step natural language is transformed into a machine-readable 
version. This is similar to the process of adapting natural speech to the requirements 
of digital assistants or telephone operators. This machine-readable version is then 
processed to create a programme that automates certain regulatory tasks.27 We will 
see below that this technology has recently been used in experiments carried out by 
the FCA.
3  Combining Technology with Regulation
In the previous section, new digital technologies have been introduced. In this sec-
tion and in the remaining sections of this paper two potential ways of integrating 
these technologies with financial regulation will be discussed. The first use case 
builds on the computer science experiments currently carried out by the FCA. The 
second use case takes the current experiments as a starting point but is, for the time 
being, science fiction. It investigates the implications of using artificial intelligence 
as a risk management tool.
3.1  Digital Regulatory Reporting
The FCA are currently working with the Bank of England to explore whether digital 
regulatory reporting could reduce the ‘compliance burden’ affecting regulated enti-
ties.28 In what are referred to as ‘TechSprints’ they explore using distributed ledger 
26 Sanjiv Ranjan et al. (2017).
27 For an excellent explanation of this type of technology see https ://digit al-legis latio n.net (accessed 11 
June 2019); see also https ://www.banko fengl and.co.uk/resea rch/finte ch/proof -of-conce pt (accessed 11 
June 2019); Butler (2017), pp 6–9.
28 Financial Conduct Authority (2018b), paras. 3.2–3.4.
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and language processing technology for ‘regulation, compliance procedures, firms’ 
policies and standards together with firm transactional applications and databases’.29
At present the FCA and the Bank of England operate a database referred to as 
Gabriel.30 Regulated entities collect their internal information, produce an electronic 
report and submit it to Gabriel. This involves manual processes which take time and 
are prone to mistakes. When the FCA receives the reports they verify completeness, 
consistency and compliance with the requirements.31 Regulated entities as well as 
the regulator believe that they would benefit from a system that removes manual 
processes from regulatory reporting.32 Gabriel, which came live in 2011, is likely to 
benefit from an upgrade in the not-so-distant future. Brexit means more freedom for 
the UK to develop new ways of regulating financial services and the government has 
a vision for the country to become a leader in digital technologies.33
Distributed ledger technology has shown ways of sharing information. A distrib-
uted ledger could be created that contains the records for reportable transactions of 
all regulated entities. This ledger would serve as an internal booking system as well 
as a reporting device. Regulated entities would record transactions as they do now 
but instead of doing this on an internal database the record would be made on a 
distributed ledger. The regulator would be supplied with direct access to that ledger. 
Cryptography would ensure that while the records are visible to the regulator other 
regulated entities do not have access to business sensitive information from their 
competitors.
In recent experiments carried out by the FCA and the Bank of England language 
processing was used to develop software to run on such a ledger. It translated report-
ing requirements contained in the FCA Handbook from English into computer 
code.34 It mapped the ‘regulatory requirements directly to the data […] creating the 
potential for automated, straight-through-processing of regulatory returns’. In Febru-
rary 2019 a second pilot phase was launched.
At present the conclusions are that, from a computer science perspective, it is 
possible to translate rules on mortgage reporting written in English into a machine-
readable and executable form. This machine-readable version of English can be used 
to create software. That software then retrieves data and creates a report for the reg-
ulator from a distributed ledger. That software can also be updated reflecting regu-
latory changes.35 In the future, the regulator and regulated entities could share the 
records of reportable transactions enabling the regulator to access the information 
on these as it is held directly with the regulated entities. Regulated entities no longer 
submit reports. The regulator would help itself to data on transactions. It could even 
use software with a ‘smart contract’ functionality that identifies breaches, makes 
32 Institute of International Finance (2016).
33 Institute of International Finance (2016).
34 Financial Conduct Authority (2018g).
35 Financial Conduct Authority (2018g).
29 Financial Conduct Authority (2018g).
30 See https ://gabri el.fca.org.uk/porta l_authe ntica tion_servi ce/appma nager /merpo rtal/deskt op (accessed 
6 June 2019).
31 Financial Conduct Authority (2018b), paras. 3.2–3.5.
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suggestions for sanctions or perhaps even automatically issues fines.36 The focus of 
the next stage of project is on questions of economic viability, the possibility of third 
party providers and data definitions.37
3.2  Machine Learning As a Risk Management Tool
It would be possible to extend the access for regulatory software to more than just 
specific transactions. Such software could access the records of all transactions 
entered into by regulated entities. This could be combined with machine learn-
ing.38 Software could be developed that autonomously analyses transactions as they 
are recorded by the regulated entity. The analysis could be extended to the entire 
information system operated by a regulated entity. In addition to transaction records 
regulatory software could monitor other data files, email and voice communication 
carried out by employees of regulated entities. This would be a step up from keeping 
records of telephone conversations and email exchanges and would have to be done 
through a form of analysis that is consistent with protecting the personal information 
of individuals.39
The software could be taught to autonomously identify risk as it emerges. Regu-
lators and regulated entities would be able to locate and address problems at an ear-
lier stage than they are now. The software could be integrated into the regulation of 
micro-prudential risk management as a tool helping to prevent individual firms form 
failing.40 There is a suggestion that this might liberate regulatory capital. Capital 
requirements are currently triggered by an analysis of the asset profile of a bank. In 
the future the trigger for capital requirements could be the product of machine learn-
ing analytics allowing a broader and deeper range of information to be processed in 
the analysis of financial institutions.41
This could be combined with a smart contract functionality which, like in the first 
use case, automates enforcement.
3.3  Advantages and Risks
In this subsection, the advantages and risks associated with the technology will be 
examined. Regulatory technology could make compliance easier for regulated enti-
ties. It could make regulation nimbler and precise and supply the regulator with 
more accurate and real time information. It could support regulatory processes by 
36 Financial Conduct Authority (2019); Financial Conduct Authority (2018i); Financial Conduct Author-
ity (2016), pp 8–9; Treleaven (2015).
37 Financial Conduct Authority (2019).
38 Financial Conduct Authority (2019); Arner et al. (2017), p 382; more generally Yeung (2018).
39 Colaert (2015), para. 57; Korff et al. (2017); Crawford and Schultz (2014), p 93; Ajunwa et al. (2017), 
p 735.
40 Institute of International Finance (2016), pp 11–13; more generally on the challenges of micro-pru-
dential regulation see Lastra (2013), p 221; for the role of capital in micro-prudential regulation see also 
Kern (2015), p 335; see also Mülbert (2015), pp 369–381.
41 Arner et al. (2017), p 396; Institute of International Finance (2016), pp 11–13.
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informing them through data-based analysis. Levels of standardisation may increase. 
Like any form of innovation, new technology is associated with risks that are, for 
the time being, unknown. Regulatory technology introduces a new type of service 
provider to the regulatory environment.
3.3.1  Making Compliance Easy
At present the FCA regulates the outcome, rather than process, in accordance with 
the statutory objectives of ensuring consumer protection, market integrity and com-
petitive markets. The regulator acts on the basis of legislation. Based on their man-
date they write rules in the version of English that is customarily used in a legal 
context and publish them. The FCA is neutral towards the technology used by the 
entities it regulates.42 It does not matter how firms maintain records or organise 
themselves as long as they produce the reports required and comply otherwise with 
rules contained in the Handbook and its underlying legislation. Regulated entities 
carry the risk of interpreting the rules and putting in place a system that ensures that 
they comply.43 They employ human beings who read and interpret these regulations. 
Each entity takes a view on how to implement them including any technology that 
is used to facilitate compliance. They may seek legal advice and/or liaise with the 
regulator. Compliance is ultimately assessed by the courts.
Regulatory technology could make compliance easier. Rather than writing rules 
in legal English the regulator could write rules in machine-readable English or pre-
scribe particular software applications. This would leave less room for regulated 
entities taking the wrong approach.
Making compliance straightforward can help to increase levels of compliance.44 
Realistically however, irrespective of the tools used for regulatory purposes regu-
lated entities have a choice. They can either observe regulatory requirements or 
alternatively they can appear to be compliant by working out how to avoid detection 
from the regulators including their technology.45
3.3.2  Making Regulation Nimble
At present when the rules are updated each entity reads the new regulations, takes a 
view on how to implement them and updates their systems accordingly adding data 
fields or making other modifications.46 This makes it hard to change course. Reg-
ulatory software could simplify the process. Adapting to regulatory change could 
become as simple as installing a software update.
44 Arner et al. (2017), p 375.
45 Packin (2018), pp 212–215; see also Colaert (2015), para. 57 (in relation to technology that assists 
bank employees to evaluate clients).
46 Financial Conduct Authority (2018b), paras. 3.2–3.5.
42 Financial Conduct Authority (2018b), para. 2.6; Financial Conduct Authority (2018c), p 5.
43 Financial Conduct Authority (2018b), para. 3.3.
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Regulatory technology can also assist with adapting regulation to changes in the 
market. Machine learning can help to analyse regulated entities and markets and 
identify patterns that may indicate the emergence of risk requiring an update of reg-
ulatory requirements. They may find, for example, that certain practices are emerg-
ing and incorporate these into their monitoring activity.
3.3.3  Making Regulation More Precise
Computer code is more precise than natural language. The process of translating 
legal English into machine-readable English and onwards into computer code will 
make rules more precise.47 Replacing ambiguous legal terms with precise computer 
code changes meaning. By becoming more precise the scope of a rule narrows. 
Removing ambiguity can also cause meaning to shift away from its original focus. 
In addition, computer code has its own albeit more limited ambiguities. Coding is a 
process of working with the limitations of the respective programming language.48 
Creating regulatory software, while being an exciting exercise in computer science, 
also involves policy choice.49 A decision needs to be made on how individual terms 
are translated and also more broadly on which elements of the regulatory framework 
will benefit from higher levels of precision.50
3.3.4  More Accurate and Real‑Time Information
Digital reporting would change what kind of and how quickly information is availa-
ble to the regulator. It could give the regulator access to information as it is recorded 
internally by regulated entities. The regulator would receive more accurate infor-
mation than it does now. It would be supplied with better quality evidence for its 
decision making. It would also be informed about transactions as soon as they are 
booked on the shared record and thus receive a close to real-time picture on the 
transactions entered into by regulated entities.51
3.3.5  Data‑Based Analysis
The available evidence can be analysed through artificial intelligence.52 Machine 
learning can process large amounts of information. It can help to identify risk in 
data supplied by regulated entities. This can alert the regulator and regulated enti-
ties to problems that appear to be emerging. It could also enable the regulator to 
closely supervise the entire population of regulated entities rather than just a 
47 Burt et al. (2017); Colaert (2015), paras. 25–26; see also Pasquale (2019).
48 Al Khalil et al. (2017).
49 Packin (2018), pp 215–217; Pasquale (2019).
50 There is also a possibility for using the availability of data to creating personalising regulation (for 
this see Helleringer 2019).
51 Burt et al. (2017), p 4; Arner et al. (2017), p 382.
52 Packin (2018), p 207; Arner et al. (2017), p 382.
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selected number.53 This has been described as leading to a profound transformation 
of the approach to regulation.54 This analysis also has the potential to be extended to 
reveal macro-economic interconnectedness allowing for better monitoring of macro-
prudential risks.55 This may also open up the possibility for personalised regulatory 
interventions.56
There is a risk, however, that machine driven analysis of facts revealing them-
selves in data becomes associated with an aura of objectivity and analytical prowess 
that does not reflect the scope of the evidence the analysis is based on. The problem 
is not the analysis but the underlying data set. It is easy to overlook the limitations 
of data-based analysis. Diagnostic tools that were based on data collected from male 
individuals can, for example, cause doctors to overlook female patients presenting 
with heart attacks.57 In the context of regulation similar mistakes can occur, leading 
the regulator and regulated entities into a false sense of security.
3.3.6  Standardisation and Systemic Risk
At the moment, each regulated entity develops its own understanding of how to 
comply with regulatory requirements. The current rules allow for different interpre-
tations which are all equally lawful. This facilitates a variety of business models 
within the financial services industry. If a highly standardised financial technology 
is used across regulated entities consistency increases.58 This can reduce room for 
variety and facilitate herding. There is therefore a risk that regulated entities become 
increasingly similar causing systemic problems to arise.59
3.3.7  Technological Risks
Regulatory technology takes advantage of computer science tools that are relatively 
new. Our knowledge and understanding of any new technology is initially and invar-
iably limited. In addition, it combines computer science with law. Those trained in 
law do not normally know about the characteristics and limitations of computer soft-
ware. Those trained in computer science are not normally familiar with the scope 
and subtleties of legal terms. Neither group is well placed to anticipate problems 
that may arise when the two are combined. They may not even be in a good position 
to appreciate what it is they do not know. This makes it difficult for either group of 
experts to at least ask the right questions.
One example are potential errors in the software.60 Lawyers are not in a good 
position to imagine fact patterns. Computer scientists can imagine much better what 
53 Morse (2018).
54 Arner et al. (2017), pp 382–383.
55 Arner et al. (2017), p 402.
56 For this see Helleringer (2019).
57 Lichtman et al. (2018), p 781.
58 Financial Conduct Authority (2018j).
59 Danielson (2017); Colaert (2015), paras. 27 and 55.
60 Burt et al. (2017), p 5.
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could go wrong. But complex software tends to be opaque and it can be difficult 
even for computer scientists to predict outputs.61 In particular, artificial intelligence 
can operate in ways that are unforeseen by programmers.62 While being better placed 
than lawyers to predict potential problems, computer scientists are, however, not in 
a good position to imagine the implications of these problems for the legal context.
Another example is discriminatory bias. Biases present in the existing data set 
perhaps resulting from manual inspection regimes can easily be converted into auto-
mated biases.63 Machine learning operates on the basis of black box decision proce-
dures which makes it very difficult to work out even for computer scientists whether 
the outcome is biased and in what direction the bias is directed to.64
More generally it is impossible to predict how regulatory technology will interact 
with the financial system. It may allow us to better manage risk leading to more sta-
ble financial institutions or it may turn out to steer us in the wrong direction.
3.3.8  The Role of Technology Providers
It is possible for the regulator and for regulated entities to develop their own bespoke 
software. That is, however, not likely. Neither are necessarily interested in or well-
placed for becoming software developers. Pooling their resources, market partici-
pants have tried to co-operate to develop distributed ledger technology. They have 
set up R3. This has not had much success. The interests of industry participants 
appear to be too diverse to allow for the development of common technology.65
It is more likely that regulatory technology will introduce a new type of partici-
pant into the regulatory environment. It has been mentioned briefly at the beginning 
of this article that there is, at present, a vibrant market of start-ups who are devel-
oping regulatory software.66 RegTech events are populated by representatives from 
these businesses.67 It has been recommended that these market participants could 
be incentivised to engage in the development of regulatory technology by allowing 
some providers preferential access if only for a limited time.68
Special privileges for technology providers should be approached with caution. 
Alongside a start-up community a small number of large companies currently domi-
nate the market for data analysis and artificial intelligence. They are potentially 
also interested in serving the financial services industry. One of their strategies 
for growth is to identify and acquire smaller technology companies.69 They bring 
61 Burt et al. (2017), p 4; see also Scherer (2016), p 359.
62 Scherer (2016), p 359; Firth-Butterfield et al. (2017).
63 Yeung (2018).
64 The authors are grateful to Mark Staples for this point.
65 Robertson (2018).
66 Colaert (2015), para. 45; Arner et al. (2017), p 381.
67 See for example the list of speakers and sponsors at the London FinTech Week 2018 (https ://www.
finte chwee k.com/home) or at the London FinTech Summit 2018 (https ://ifgs.innov atefi nance .com/agend 
a-2018/).
68 Burt et al. (2017), p 8; Zetzsche et al. (2017), p 98.
69 Scherer (2016), pp 374–375.
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business interests of their own to the table which do not necessarily align with the 
public interest.
More generally we should be mindful of the problems that have in the past arisen 
in relation to credit rating agencies whose ability to act as gatekeepers was severely 
affected by the business interests.70 We are seeing similar issues in relation to audi-
tors whose business model has made it difficult for them to keep up their profes-
sional scepticism.71
4  Quality of Regulation
In the previous section, the advantages and disadvantages of the technology have 
been discussed. In this section, regulatory technology will receive scrutiny from a 
broader analytical framework. When considering how new technologies could be 
integrated into regulation a natural starting point is to revert to criteria that have 
been developed to evaluate the quality of regulation.72 These are democratic legiti-
macy, accountability of the regulator, fair, accessible and open procedures, exper-
tise and efficiency. In addition, good regulation should focus on achieving outcomes 
rather than technical compliance.73 In the following subsection the use cases for 
regulatory technology highlighted in this paper will be analysed against these six 
criteria.
4.1  Democratic Legitimacy and Accountability
First, regulation should be supported by legislative authority. The acts of the regula-
tor need to be legitimised by a mandate from a democratically elected parliament. 
The requirement for democratic legitimacy also affects the breadth of the mandate. 
For example, a statute that requires a regulator to collect reporting information on 
mortgages to ensure lending is being carried out in accordance with capital and 
other regulatory requirements, gives more specific legitimacy to the regulator than a 
statute which simply instructs the regulator to ‘promote financial stability’.74
Second, there should be an appropriate scheme of accountability. This criterion is 
connected with democratic legitimacy. If a regulator has a wide mandate involving 
a significant amount of discretion, it is all the more important for its decision mak-
ing to be subject to oversight from democratically legitimated institutions. Account-
ability may be established by involving a parliament or other democratically elected 
70 Payne (2015), p 254; see also Colaert (2015), paras. 5–6.
71 Mennicken and Power (2013), p 308.
72 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 25; see also Ferran (2015), pp 115–124; Armour et al. (2016), pp 556–575.
73 Black (2015), p 218.
74 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 143.
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body in the appointment or removal of leading decision makers working for the reg-
ulator. It may also be effected through the judiciary.75
The creation of software that automates the reporting of specific data points 
involves technology providers making a decision on the scope of terms that have 
been expressed in natural language. This does not create problems for democratic 
legitimacy or accountability if the onus of identifying a particular programme 
remains with regulated entities. They would do so at their own risk. At present, they 
instruct lawyers and programmers to assist with developing a compliant IT solu-
tion. Regulatory software can help both types of service providers or perhaps even 
replace some of their work.
Democratic legitimacy and regulatory accountability need to inform, however, the 
extent to which the regulator can out-source rule-making to technology providers. If 
the regulator decides, for example, to issue or endorse regulation in machine read-
able natural language or in computer code, it needs to keep in mind that democratic 
legitimacy and accountability limit its ability to delegate the judgement involved in 
the translation process to third party providers. In particular, the potential involve-
ment of large multinational technology providers in writing financial regulation 
will require special attention. Allowing private providers wide discretion in making 
design choices for regulatory technology could lead to an unwarranted ‘outsourcing’ 
or even ‘privatisation’ of the regulatory process,76 creating the risk of undermining 
sovereignty, and positioning it in a grey zone from a constitutional law perspective.
Moreover, regulators need to be acutely aware that the limitations of data driven 
analysis is easily overlooked. Overlooking these may not only cause them to over-
look problems. It may also cloud their ability to exercise judgement in accordance 
with democratically legitimated rules. Regulatory software should therefore be 
incorporated into the procedures operated by the regulator in a way that enables and 
encourages decision-makers to understand the scope of the data on which the analy-
sis is based and preserves their ability to act in line with their democratic mandate 
exercising independent and accountable judgement.77
Likewise, functionalities automating enforcement based on data-driven analysis 
need to be designed in a way that ensures that the regulator remains in control of the 
process.
4.2  Fair, Accessible and Open Procedures
A regulator may also claim legitimacy if it uses fair, accessible and open procedures. 
Due process is recommended both at the point of setting policy and writing regula-
tion and at the point of enforcement.
For policy setting and for the writing of regulation, trade-offs need to be made 
between allowing affected parties to participate and implementing the legislative 
mandate. Regulators operate in a polycentric environment. The different participants 
76 Ranchordás (2019), p 81.
77 See also Pasquale (2019).
75 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 143.
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have different claims to legitimacy and engage in variety of regulatory conversa-
tions. There are conflicting demands that are difficult to reconcile.78
Consultation is important. Regulation is the product of a regulatory conversation 
that allows the different constituencies to articulate their concerns and interests. Too 
much participation, however, may lead to less effective policy-making and eventu-
ally a stagnation of the regulatory system.79
In relation to regulatory technology the FCA is carrying out a public consultation 
at the moment. With any consultation, the problem arises that better funded mar-
ket participants are better able to participate actively in this process.80 The regulator 
needs to ensure that this does not lead to regulatory capture. Capture occurs when 
the regulator prioritises the interests of regulated entities over the public interest.81
For regulatory technology, the setting of policy and the writing of rules is inter-
twined with computer science. The technology has not settled yet and its develop-
ment costs money. Those who fund the development of the technology make the 
design choices. This gives a significant advantage to well-funded regulated enti-
ties enabling them to influence the process in a way which is hard to perceive. It is 
difficult to determine from the outside if particular functionalities reflect business 
reasons of the entities who provided the funding or are requirements rooted in the 
underlying computer science. The regulator therefore needs to be particularly care-
ful to remain objective when integrating regulatory technology.
Fair, accessible and open procedures also matter for enforcement. The require-
ments of due process need to inform functionalities that automate enforcement. This 
applies to regulatory technology reviewing individual data points as well as regula-
tory technology that selects and analyses data autonomously. If the analytical func-
tion of the technology is connected to an automated enforcement mechanism such as 
a ‘smart contract’ regulated entities need to be provided with procedures that enable 
them to set aside enforcement action.
4.3  Expertise
The third criterion against which regulation can be evaluated is expert judgement. 
It is possible to justify regulatory intervention on the basis that a decision maker 
possesses expert judgement. Expertise can be a basis on which the public can be 
expected to have trust in regulatory decisions. It can justify supplying the regulator 
with a broader range of discretion.82
Regulatory technology can generate high quality analysis. Machine learning can 
identify fact patterns in data that human analysts would take much longer to iden-
tify. This could inspire significant levels of reliance on regulatory technology to 
supervise regulated entities. An argument could be made that the deeper and broader 
78 Black (2008), p 137; see also Armour et al. (2016), pp 556–560.
79 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 29.
80 Armour et al. (2016), pp 558–560.
81 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 36; see also Armour et al. (2016), pp 560–562.
82 Baldwin et al. (2012), pp 29–30.
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analysis that can be achieved through artificial intelligence amounts to expert judg-
ment, which justifies removing discretion from human decision makers.
That would be a mistake. The technology is new and we do not yet fully under-
stand all the possible implications. More generally, while the process of identify-
ing risk that justifies regulatory intervention can be assisted by quantitative mecha-
nisms, risk cannot be predicted with scientific certainty. Decisions about identifying 
risk and acting on such identification involve judgement and should be subject to 
accountability.83
Moreover, problems of regulatory capture may arise also in relation to expertise. 
The FCA and the Bank of England have set up special units for regulatory technol-
ogy.84 These are intended to work closely with regulated entities. Regulators have 
governance mechanisms in place to ensure that those setting policy are removed 
from close interaction with regulated entities. But at the moment there is a knowl-
edge gap. Those setting policy at senior levels do not necessarily have technologi-
cal expertise enabling them to critically evaluate the information they are presented 
with. The regulator needs to be sure that its senior decision makers have access to 
expertise enabling them to exercise professional judgement from the perspective of 
its democratic mandate and the public interest.85
4.4  Efficiency
The fourth criterion against which regulation can be assessed is efficiency. Effi-
ciency can be determined by reference to the implementation of the legislative man-
date. Another way of assessing efficiency would be by reference to the results deliv-
ered by the regulatory process. Either way efficiency often conflicts with social aims 
of regulation which are difficult to quantify and is therefore a contested criterion.86
In relation to regulatory technology both the regulator and regulated entities are 
engaging in the process because they expect cost savings.87 At present there have 
only been experiments which have shown that a type of software that writes pro-
grammes that automate the reporting of one data point works. Nevertheless, the use 
of regulatory technology is in the FCA’s business plan.88
Time will tell if the savings delivered by regulatory technology outperform the 
cost involved in setting up and overseeing the mechanism that will evolve going for-
ward. It is, for example, not yet clear how easy it will be to ‘map’ machine read-
able code or new regulatory software tools onto existing IT systems.89 It is pos-
sible that regulated entities will need to spend significant amounts of money to 
make their legacy systems compatible with any new mechanism, with some in the 
83 Black (2005), p 512.
84 See above.
85 See also Chiu (2017), p 763.
86 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 31.
87 Colaert (2015), paras. 43 and 178; Packin (2018), p 207.
88 Financial Conduct Authority (2018a), p 27.
89 Financial Conduct Authority (2018j).
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industry predicting that such costs may be prohibitively expensive.90 This problem 
is amplified by the fact that many regulated entities store relevant data in multiple 
legacy systems and different formats.91 An additional problem arises because invest-
ments in new technology can be more challenging for smaller than for larger market 
participants.92
4.5  Precision v. Flexibility
To determine efficiency the cost and the output of regulatory regimes are expressed 
in monetary terms and compared. Connected to this is the question of which type 
of rules best serves the respective aims of regulation. For regulatory technology, 
this aspect of designing regulation deserves a heading of its own. There is a choice 
between granular rules and general principles or standards. Granular rules are more 
certain, but inflexible.93 This can strangle competition and stunt enterprise and 
growth.94 Granular rules can also encourage box ticking.95 Principles and standards 
are flexible but come at the price of ambiguity which creates uncertainty.
A hallmark of good regulation is the extent to which a regulator focuses on out-
comes rather than on technical compliance.96 Following the financial crisis trust in 
the ability of regulated entities to align their business interests with regulatory aims 
has diminished. Regulators have become more interventionist. This, however, has 
not harmed the firm belief that ‘conduct should be in accordance with the princi-
ples and purposes of the rules, not the letter’.97 A good quality regulatory regime 
achieves more than technical compliance.
We have seen that regulatory technology has been said to be capable of delivering 
more precise and certain rules.98 The capability of software to operate to high lev-
els of precision is, however, also a limitation. Software is at present not as capable 
as natural language to operate flexibly. This may be a temporary issue that will be 
solved by computer scientists in the future.
90 An example of how difficult it can be to adopt new information technology recently occurred in the 
UK. Following a restructuring TSB Bank moved customer accounts to the IT system operated by its new 
owners, Sabadell. The anticipation was that this would be a seamless process. The migration, however, 
turned out to be more complex than expected. It resulted in customers being unable to access their own 
accounts over a period of several days with problems persisting over weeks. Some 400 customers gained 
access to accounts that did not belong to them. Branches were unable to operate. The telephone system 
collapsed (Andrew Bailey, CEO of the FCA, letter dated 30 May 2018 responding to Nicky Morgan, MP, 
https ://www.parli ament .uk/docum ents/commo ns-commi ttees /treas ury/Corre spond ence/2017-19/fca-to-
chair -tsb-30051 8.pdf, accessed 6 June 2019).
91 Financial Conduct Authority (2018k), para. 2.8.
92 Financial Conduct Authority (2016), pp 11 and 14; Colaert (2015), paras. 3–4.
93 Diver (1983), p 65.
94 Diver (1983), p 65.
95 Better Regulation Task Force (2003), p 16.
96 Black (2015), p 245.
97 Black (2015), p 240; see also Armour et al. (2016), p 551.
98 Subsection 3.3.3, above.
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For the time being however, policy makers need to determine for which context 
high levels of precision are desirable. For the reporting of individual data points the 
current framework already operates at a high level of granularity. Creating software 
that automates this process through technology does not change this.
It is nevertheless possible for unintended consequences to arise.99 For example, at 
present regulators receive transactions reports with a delay in time. If they identify 
problems regulated entities are able to make the point that these have been resolved. 
When the regulator receives real-time transactional information its systems can 
respond in real-time. There is a risk that this encourages regulated entities to orient 
themselves towards impressing the regulator in real-time. They could become too 
focused on real-time reporting, orient their business model accordingly and inad-
vertently overlook longer-term risks.
This could have the same unwelcome effect that was generated by the require-
ments for quarterly reports for listed companies. In the post-mortem following the 
financial crisis it emerged that these reporting requirements caused companies to 
focus on generating positive short-term metrics and steered them away from making 
adequate provisions for long-term risks.100
For assessments that are currently carried out using general principles or stand-
ards the use of regulatory software would change the regulatory design to a more 
granular level. This may be desirable. The effect of increased levels of precision 
should nevertheless be the result of a deliberate decision in the respective context 
rather than an unintended effect using new digital technology.
5  Strategies for Regulation
In Sect. 4 we saw that delivering and claiming quality presents special challenges to 
integrating regulatory technology into regulation. Section 5 takes that broad argu-
ment to a more particular level by analysing how those challenges vary according 
to the regulatory strategy being put into effect. There are a variety of regulatory 
strategies available for financial regulation.101 The choice lies somewhere between 
control and freedom. Governments can either impose rules backed by sanctions or 
leave businesses to their own devices.102 Three principled options will be examined 
here: command regulation, a self-regulatory approach and meta-regulation. We will 
also briefly look at an activity-based regulatory model. We will see that different 
advantages and problems arise when technology is integrated into a command as 
compared to a meta-regulatory or self-regulatory approach. It will also be shown 
that technology is not neutral. Its availability does not supply regulated entities with 
greater ability to make their business decisions align with the public interest.
100 Kay (2012), paras. 10.20–10.21 and Interim Report (2012), paras. 4.14–4.15.
101 Black (2015), p 218; Baldwin et al. (2012), p 34.
102 Coglianese and Mendelson (2010), p 146.
99 Ibid; Burt et al. (2017), p 5—see reference to the risk of ‘incorrect disambiguation’.
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5.1  Command Regulation
The essence of a command regulatory strategy is in its control of the achievement 
of certain outcomes by imposing sanctions where outcomes are not met. The gov-
ernment is in charge. It writes rules and designs sanctions through primary or sec-
ondary legislation and a regulatory body enforces them.103 The regime that was put 
in place after the financial crisis can in large parts be characterised as a command 
regime.
A command approach could integrate regulatory technology. The government 
could control the development, its maintenance and updates of the technology.104 
It could issue software requiring regulated entities to run that software on their 
systems.
This would address the problem that the coding involves policy choices. Making 
these choices would remain with the government or the regulator.
Command regulation is generally associated with a preference for granular 
rules.105 This fits with the characteristics that are ascribed to digital technology 
which generally struggles to integrate ambiguous terms.106 Using a more precise 
tool the regulator would be able to create a more certain framework. There is, how-
ever, a risk that a regulator with a preference for granularity overuses an instrument 
that can only operate to high levels of precision and produces a framework that suf-
fers from inflexibility. This could make it difficult for different business models to 
thrive and creates a source for systemic risk.107
Command regulation is said to be expensive for both the government and for reg-
ulated entities. The government needs to both write appropriate rules and develop an 
enforcement mechanism.108 In our context an additional cost factor is that a regula-
tor who designs technology at an operational level would also have to assume a sig-
nificant part of the technological risk.109
If the regulator developed regulatory software the regulated entities would 
save the money they currently spend to design compliance solutions. They would, 
however, have to absorb the cost of connecting their existing IT systems with that 
software.
It has already been mentioned that regulatory technology is particularly suscep-
tible to capture. The line between policy decisions and computer science require-
ments is not a bright one and, in any event, not visible for non-experts. The reg-
ulators’ technology teams are necessarily closely involved with regulated entities. 
Senior decision makers are further removed but suffer from a knowledge gap. Under 
a command approach the risk of capture is particularly acute. This is because the 
103 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 106.
104 Enriques (2017), p 5.
105 Baldwin et al. (2012), pp 108–109.
106 Subsection 3.3.3, above.
107 Danielson (2017); Colaert (2015), para. 27.
108 Baldwin et al. (2012), pp 110–111; see also Burt et al. (2017), p 8.
109 Colaert (2015), para. 51.
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regulator needs to rely on information provided by the industry to write rules. In 
giving information to the regulator, entities can exercise a ‘degree of leverage over 
regulatory procedures’, which can, over time, produce capture.110 If the regulator 
decides to integrate regulatory technology into a command framework robust gov-
ernance mechanisms would have to be put in place to avoid the problem of capture.
From the perspective of a potentially closed market of technology providers 
there are advantages associated with keeping its development close to the govern-
ment which has significant bargaining power allowing it to exercise control over 
its content. This, however, comes at a price. The regulator needs to have sufficient 
resources to be able to have the expertise required to adequately oversee the opera-
tional aspects of the process.
5.2  Self‑Regulatory Approaches
This approach to regulation relies on market mechanisms. The idea is that regulated 
entities have a business incentive to abide by certain standards.111 They want to 
impress their customers. These are sensitive to poor practices and this will ensure 
that appropriate standards are developed and observed.
Self-regulatory approaches normally have some form of a statutory backing.112 
Self-regulation with a statutory mandate was the approach adopted in the UK 
between 1986 and 1998.113 It has since been discredited culminating in a statement 
by Joseph Stiglitz who referred to the idea that markets can self-regulate as an oxy-
moron.114 Following the financial crisis, self-regulation has been described as a 
model ‘in retreat’.115
An analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of self-regulatory approaches 
is nevertheless useful here. As the memory of the financial crisis fades the financial 
services industry is likely to assert its influence over the policymaking process push-
ing for de-regulation.116 The current interest in regulatory technology is motivated 
by the perceived burden created by post-crises regulation and could be characterised 
as move in that direction.
Self-regulatory approaches are likely to resurface particularly for regulatory 
technology. An argument could be made that the availability of new technological 
tools makes it possible for the regulator to step back and leave it to the market, now 
equipped with regulatory technology, to create appropriate frameworks.
Under a self-regulatory approach the regulator would forget about regulatory 
reporting and would not get involved in participating in a distributed ledger. It could 
appoint an industry association and instruct it to develop risk-managing technology. 
111 Armour et al. (2016), p 546.
112 Baldwin et al. (2012), pp 137–139; Armour et al. (2016), pp 545–551.
113 Black (2015), pp 219–221.
114 Ferran (2015), p 110; Deakin (2015), p 14; see also Ogus (1995), p 97; Black (2001), p 103.
115 Ferran (2015), p 110.
116 Armour et al. (2016), p 554; Deakin (2015), pp 34–55.
110 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 108.
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Alternatively, it could require individual firms to adopt appropriate regulatory tech-
nology. For both approaches the government would endorse the technology at some 
high level but would not get involved in writing rules either in legal or machine-
readable English or in computer code. It would stand back and let individual firms 
or their associations develop appropriate practices.
Self-regulatory forms of regulation have been credited with advantages. The gov-
ernment does not pay for the design of the standards or for their enforcement.117 
Specialised knowledge can be built into regulation.118 Rules can be tailored to indi-
vidual companies or sectors to higher degree than under a meta-regulatory model. 
This can facilitate regulatory innovation.119 Further, it has been suggested that regu-
lated entities are more likely to comply with rules they have created themselves and 
that such rules would be more targeted making it easier to enforce them.120 Enforce-
ment can moreover be delegated to specialist bodies which are able to impose indus-
try appropriate, and thus more effective, sanctions.121
There are also disadvantages associated with a self-regulatory approach. There 
are concerns about democratic legitimacy and accountability when rules are made 
by self-regulatory bodies that are not bound by legislation or accountable to the gov-
ernment.122 The same problem arises in relation to enforcement. If a self-regula-
tory body is more accountable to its members than general public, this is likely to 
prompt trust issues.123 It may find it difficult to enforce regulation where it would 
negatively affect its members’ business or reputation.124 Self-regulatory bodies can 
have a tendency to act anti-competitively by setting access requirements or prices 
that suit the interests of their members rather than the general public.125 This may 
stifle competition.
Moreover, it would not be easy for industry associations to develop a common 
framework. Regulated entities can pool resources to fund technological development 
only in so far as they have overlapping interests. This makes it difficult for them 
to co-operate. For technology, finding common ground is particularly difficult not 
only because there are competing business interests but also because different enti-
ties have different legacy systems. Entities that have formed as a result of corporate 
restructuring sometimes operate more than one IT system because it has proven to 
be too difficult to connect them domestically.
There is also a concern that regulated entities are unable to find much common 
ground between their interests and the public interest. They will then focus on being 
seen to be compliant rather than on ensuring that they actually meet the standards. 
117 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 140; Ogus (1995), p 97; Ferran (2015), pp 110–111; Burt et al. (2017).
118 Ferran (2015), p 110; Baldwin et al. (2012), p 139; Armour et al. (2016), pp 545–546.
119 Ferran (2015), p 111.
120 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 139; Ferran (2015), p 110.
121 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 140; Better Regulation Task Force (2003), p 46.
122 See for example Baldwin et al. (2012), pp 141–146; Ogus (1995), p 98.
123 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 143; Ferran (2015), p 111.
124 Armour et al. (2016), p 546.
125 Baldwin et  al. (2012), p 143, discussing Domberger and Sherr (1989), p 41; Shaked and Sutton 
(1981), p 217.
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Self-regulatory systems are said to be susceptible to gaming because there is no 
independent regulator monitoring compliance.
The regulator could decide to use the availability of regulatory technology as an 
opportunity to review the interventionist approach that was adopted after the finan-
cial crises. It could take the view that the reforms have proven to be too expensive 
and limiting. It could modify its regulatory strategy. That is a matter for policy 
choice and weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of the various regulatory 
models.
The availability of new technological tools is, however, no reason to change gear. 
Technology does not change the fact that self-regulation relies on trusting regulated 
entities to adopt robust mechanisms. Both the advantages and the disadvantages of 
self-regulation apply for regulatory technology. The technology is not neutral. It 
serves those who develop it. It would be wrong to assume that any form of technol-
ogy will allow us to have greater faith in the ability of regulated entities to align 
their business interest with the public interest.
If anything, technology adds a level of complexity that has to inform regulatory 
decision making. For a self-regulatory model and perhaps more so than any other 
approach, the problem arises that the market for technology providers of data analy-
sis has its own business models and has the potential to become quite concentrated. 
Technology providers and their business model could steer the design of the tech-
nology further away from the public interest.
5.3  Meta‑Regulation
Meta-regulation has been described as ‘the state’s oversight of self-regulatory 
arrangements’,126 and also as ‘interactions between different regulatory actors or 
levels of regulation’.127 It occupies a middle ground somewhere between command 
regulation with a high level of government involvement and self-regulation with a 
minimal amount of government involvement. The regulator delegates risk control 
to the regulated entities themselves, giving them primary responsibility for the risk 
management systems, while the regulator audits, monitors and incentivises the sys-
tems. The regulator steers, the regulated entities row.128
The regulator would not design or maintain regulatory software itself but oversee 
and validate its production. The regulator could specify requirements leading to the 
creation of a distributed reporting ledger leaving the development and maintenance 
of the system to regulated entities or their providers. The regulator could issue a 
machine-readable version of the rules for reporting specific data points. It could also 
issue technical specifications setting out some common operational standards but 
would refrain from developing particular software applications.129
126 Hutter (2006), p 215.
127 Coglianese et al. (2010), p 147.
128 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 147.
129 Financial Conduct Authority (2016), p 12.
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In the future, the regulator could step back from specifying which data is to be 
submitted or analysed leaving it to autonomous algorithms to work out patterns 
and information that is relevant for measuring risk. It would nevertheless remain 
involved in writing specifications for and in validating software that is used for these 
purposes.130
Keeping in mind that coding involves policy choices and that data generates a 
limited picture, the regulator would be able to set its level of involvement in a way 
that preserves democratic legitimacy and regulatory accountability. Moreover, pro-
cedural requirements could be prescribed such that the technology operates in a fair, 
accessible and open manner.
Meta-regulation has been credited with the ability to generate a positive compli-
ance culture, ‘as firms are asked to think for themselves about the challenges of con-
trolling’ particular risks.131 For this benefit to materialise, however, firms must have 
both the ‘capacity for self-regulation’ and the ‘internal resolve to self-regulate’.132 
Like principled-based regulation, which assumes that regulated entities are able 
to abide by certain principles,133 meta-regulation can fail when firms do not adopt 
appropriate rules or, for our context, appropriate technology because they are unin-
formed, ill-intentioned or give priority to business considerations.134
Further, meta-regulation has been credited with low cost for the regulator.135 
From the perspective of the regulator, writing specifications and validating appli-
cations is cheaper than being involved in writing software applications. The regu-
lator would have to invest to develop and preserve its ability to write appropriate 
specifications and approve the applications based on these, but it would not have to 
fund the full cost of developing regulatory software. These would be borne by regu-
lated entities. By not involving itself at the operational level the regulator would also 
avoid responsibility for technological risk. These would have to be resolved between 
regulated entities and their service providers.
From the perspective of regulated entities the cost of complying with meta-reg-
ulation is also thought to be lower than the cost of complying with command regu-
lation.136 By automating certain processes regulatory software could indeed make 
compliance cheaper for regulated entities. The initial cost of developing new digital 
technology that integrates into existing systems could, however, be significant.
130 An example of such an approach of integrating technology into regulation can be found in the US 
Code of Federal Regulations (https ://www.gpo.gov/fdsys /granu le/CFR-2017-title 17-vol1/CFR-2017-title 
17-vol1-sec23 -155/conte nt-detai l.html, accessed 1 October 2018). Title 17 part 23 rule 155 concerns the 
requirements for the calculation of margin requirements for swaps. Rather than receiving reports of indi-
vidual data points the SEC sets requirements for and approves the methodology to be used by regulated 
entities.
131 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 148.
132 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 149.
133 Black (2015), pp 238–239; Armour et al. (2016), pp 549–551.
134 Ayers and Braithwaite (1991), pp 120–128; Black (1998); see also Baldwin et al. (2012), pp 156–
157.
135 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 147.
136 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 148.
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A meta-regulation model can facilitate the emergence of firm-specific rules.137 
Involving the regulator at a higher level of abstraction would make it possible for 
different firms to develop different types of regulatory software which fit both the 
regulatory specifications and their respective business models. This might help to 
alleviate concerns about systemic risk.
Finally like for command and for self-regulation it remains to be seen how a 
meta-regulatory model will cope with the introduction of technology providers into 
the regulatory space. The regulator will have to develop an understanding of the 
business model of the technology providers and determine its level of oversight 
accordingly with a view to preserving the public interest. To be able to act as an 
effective monitor of software developed by an oligopolistic market will require a 
robust amount of expertise.
5.4  Activity‑Based Model of Regulation
The standard classification model for regulatory strategies analyses regulation 
depending on the level of state intervention. In contrast to this Professor Heyvaert is 
proposing a classification model based on regulatory activity rather than state inter-
vention.138 Regulation operates at different levels that require different approaches. 
These are: the identification of high level policy goals, the normalisation of these 
goals for example through the creation of rules and standards, engagement activity 
for example through communication, learning activity through feedback loops and 
response-based activity ensuring compliance.139 This perspective allows the analysis 
of the interventions independently of how much the state involves itself. From this 
perspective it is important to ensure that any fascination with technological innova-
tion does not get in the way of a fundamental understanding of the big picture and 
limits the ability of regulatory actors to set high level goals.
5.5  Conclusions
Regulatory technology is no silver bullet. It does not allow the regulator to have 
more faith in the ability of a regulated entity to align their profit-making goals with 
the public interest. The choice of regulatory strategy should not be affected by the 
availability of regulatory technology. For all three approaches discussed in this sec-
tion, the role of the providers of regulatory technology needs to be addressed. This 
is most easily done for a command approach and quite difficult in a self-regulatory 
model. If regulatory technology is integrated into a command approach, however, 
the problem could arise that requirements become increasing granular and inflex-
ible which would stifle innovation and growth and could also increase levels of sys-
temic risk. It would seem that a meta-regulatory model that preserves the regulator’s 
138 Heyvaert (2018).
139 Heyvaert (2018).
137 Baldwin et al. (2012), p 147.
Regulatory Technology: Replacing Law with Computer Code 
123
democratic mandate and accountability as well as procedural fairness would be a 
suitable way to integrate new digital technologies into regulation. Either way, the 
regulator will need robust technological expertise to make the technology work in 
the public interest.
6  Conclusions
The article examined the use of new digital technologies for regulatory purposes. 
The analysis covered distributed ledger technology and two aspects of artificial 
intelligence: natural language processing and machine learning. To focus the discus-
sion two potential use cases were examined in more depth: the use of distributed 
ledger technology and machine learning software to automate regulatory reporting 
requirements and the use of machine learning as a risk management tool.
At an operational level these technologies could make compliance easier. They 
could make regulation more precise and supply the regulator with more accurate and 
real time information. The regulator could be enabled to supervise the whole popu-
lation of regulated entities benefitting from granular evidence supplied in real time. 
The technologies could also assist the regulator and regulated entities in analysing 
this evidence allowing them to identify risk as it emerges.
A natural starting point to evaluate regulatory technology is to review it against 
analytical criteria that have evolved in the mainstream regulatory discourse. A num-
ber of points emerge from this analysis.
Regulatory technology integrates policy choice with coding software. Considera-
tions of democratic legitimacy and accountability therefore limit the extent to which 
the regulator can leave the translation of regulation into software to third party tech-
nology providers.
The regulator needs to avoid the temptation of over-estimating the scope of the 
evidence and analysis generated by new digital technologies. Data is a good and an 
objective source of information. Algorithms find patterns that humans overlook. But 
data is never complete and predicting risk is not a scientific endeavor. Regulatory 
legitimacy would be seriously undermined by an approach that fails to ensure that 
the scope of the evidence underlying data-driven analysis is robustly communicated 
to the decision makers who rely on regulatory technology.
Functionalities that automate enforcement need to incorporate requirements of 
due process.
There is significant risk of regulatory capture. Policy decisions are connect-
ing with coding decisions. The line between policy choice and computer science 
requirements is not a bright one and not visible to non-experts. The technology 
teams of the regulators are close to regulated entities and this may compromise their 
professional scepticism. Senior decision makers suffer from a knowledge gap. The 
regulator needs to invest in expertise.
Unintended consequences can emerge. Real-time reporting could lead to short 
term thinking. Regulatory technology could cause regulation to become more gran-
ular, leading to inflexibility, technical rather than functional compliance and increas-
ing standardisation. This could generate systemic risk.
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The providers of technology will play a significant role. They are for the time 
being small start-up enterprises. But the more the regulators rely on new digital 
technology the more attractive the market for regulatory technology will become for 
the handful of existing providers of data analysis. Their involvement in writing soft-
ware that monitors risk may become similar to the role performed by credit rating 
agencies or auditors. This will bring with it the same difficult task of ensuring that 
the monitoring device that emerges serves the public interest.
Regulatory technology is said to help deliver better quality compliance and regu-
lation for less money. Time will tell if savings arising from automating processes 
and mechanising analysis will outperform the cost involved in developing, connect-
ing and maintaining the technology on the existing legacy systems.
In terms of identifying a suitable regulatory strategy the regulator has a number 
of options available. It could develop regulatory software exercising full control of 
its maintenance and update at an operational level. It could step back and appoint 
an industry association or leave regulated entities to create software that manages 
risk. The regulator would endorse this self-regulatory mechanism at a high level of 
abstraction but would not proactively involve itself in its development. It could adopt 
a meta-regulatory approach overseeing the development and maintenance of regula-
tory software by private providers without having full control at an operational level.
All types of regulation have advantages and disadvantages. In most regulatory 
contexts, a combination of various strategies of regulation are employed.140 The 
characteristics of regulatory technology will play out in different ways for each of 
these strategies and need to be accommodated accordingly. But technology is not 
neutral. It is programmed to reflect the preferences of those who oversee its devel-
opment. While regulatory technology can change the game, it will not be able to 
change the fact that business interests do not always align with the interests that the 
regulator has been set up to serve. It would be wrong to assume that regulatory tech-
nology is a silver bullet that will make it easier for regulated entities to align their 
interests with regulatory standards.
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